

Platonism & Dualism

Course Plan and Reading List
Advanced Tutorials: PHIL3101
Spring Term 2018
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About the course:

In this course we will look closely at why Platonism and substance dualism have historically seemed attractive, why they have fallen out of favour, insofar as they have, and what the correct verdict on their status is. In the first half of the term we will look at Platonism, which is the view according to which abstract objects exist. In the second half of the term we will look at substance dualism, which is the view according to which the mind/soul is a non-physical concrete object. We will begin each half of term with consideration of the historical source of the relevant view. Over the course of the term we will discuss the relation between the two views, and the degree of correspondence between the various challenges that face them.

Each week (excepting the introductory meeting) one student will write a 2,000 word essay responding to the relevant essay question. That student must email their essay to me and their tutorial partner at least 2 hours before our meeting, so that we can both read the essay in advance. The student who has written the essay that week will then present their argument in the tutorial, and their partner will present a brief response, consisting of (a) a question, (b) a point of agreement, (c) a critical challenge, and (d) a suggested response to the challenge. We will then collectively discuss the essay, the response, and any additional questions.

The summative assessment is a 3,500 word essay, to be submitted at the beginning of the summer term. This essay may be a development of one of your tutorial essays.

Starred (*) readings are core, and compulsory for both students. Other readings are additional, and optional. Square-bracketed ([]) readings are just for later work on summative essays.

Optional background reading:

SEP entry on Platonism, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/>

SEP entry on Abstract Objects, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/>

SEP entry on Dualism, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism>

Quine, W.V.O (1961) 'On What There Is', *From a Logical Point of View*, 2nd ed., New York: Harper and Row.

Topics:

1. Introductory Meeting
2. Platonic Forms and Souls
3. Contemporary Platonism
4. The Epistemological Problem for Platonism
5. The Ontology of Art
6. Cartesian Dualism
7. The Interaction Problem for Cartesian Dualism
8. The Ghost in the Machine
9. Property Dualism
10. Feminism and Dualism

Week 1: Introductory Meeting.

I will provide an outline of the topics and issues to be discussed throughout the term. We will then discuss the format that future meetings and weekly preparation will take.

Week 2: Platonic Forms and Souls.

*Plato (1997). 'Phaedo', in John M. Cooper (ed.), *Plato: Complete Works*. Hackett. 56c - 68c; 70a - 84b.

Sedley, David (2016). 'An Introduction to Plato's Theory of Forms'. *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* 78.

[Rasmussen, Will (2009). 'The Realism of Universals in Plato and Nyāya.' *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 37 (3):231-252.]

[Fine, Gail (1993). 'Text and Translation' and 'Introduction' in *On Ideas: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms*. Oxford University Press.]

[Frede, Dorothea (1978). 'The Final Proof of the Immortality of the Soul in Plato's "Phaedo" 102a-107a.' *Phronesis* 23 (1):1-41.]

Optional listening: 'Famous Last Words: Plato's Phaedo', on *History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps*: <https://historyofphilosophy.net/Plato-Phaedo>.

Optional listening: 'All or Nothing: The Medieval Problem of Universals', on *History of Philosophy Without any Gaps*: <https://www.historyofphilosophy.net/problem-universals>.

Essay Question: What motivates the theory of forms that is presented in the Phaedo? Is this theory well-motivated?

Week 3: Contemporary Platonism.

*Maddy, Penelope (1990). 'Realism' in *Realism in Mathematics*. Oxford University Press.

Swoyer, Chris (2008). 'Abstract Entities' in *Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics*. Blackwell.

Lewis, David (1986). *On the Plurality of Worlds*. Blackwell. §1.7: Concreteness, pp. 81-86.

[Burgess, John P. & Rosen, Gideon A. (1997). *A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics*. Oxford University Press. pp. 13-35.]

[Hale, Bob (1987). *Abstract Objects*. Blackwell. Ch. 1.]

[Dorr, Cian (2008). 'There are no Abstract Objects' in *Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics*. Blackwell.]

[Goodman, Nelson & Quine, W. V. (1947). 'Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism.' *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 12 (4):105-122.]

Essay Question: Do abstracta have a distinctive explanatory role?

Week 4: The Epistemological Problem for Platonism.

*Liggins, David (2010). 'Epistemological Objections to Platonism.' *Philosophy Compass* 5 (1):67-77.

Giaquinto, Marcus (2012). 'Russell on Knowledge of Universals by Acquaintance.' *Philosophy* 87 (04):497-508.

Burgess, John P. & Rosen, Gideon A. (1997). *A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics*. Oxford University Press. pp. 35-60.

[Field, Hartry (1982). 'Realism and Anti-Realism about Mathematics.' *Philosophical Topics* 13 (1):45-69.]

[Maddy, Penelope (1990). 'Perception and Intuition' in *Realism in Mathematics*. Oxford University Press.]

[Giaquinto, Marcus (2001). 'Knowing Numbers'. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 98(1):5-18.]

Essay Question: Is there an epistemological problem for Platonism? If so, what is it?

Week 5: The Ontology of Art.

*Walters, Lee (2013). 'Repeatable Artworks as Created Types.' *British Journal of Aesthetics* 53 (4):461-477.

van Inwagen, Peter (1977). 'Creatures of Fiction.' *American Philosophical Quarterly* 14 (4): 299 - 308.

Thomasson, Amie L. (2006). 'Debates about the Ontology of Art: What are We Doing Here?' *Philosophy Compass* 1 (3):245-255.

[Thomasson, Amie L. (1998). *Fiction and Metaphysics*. Cambridge University Press. Ch. 1&3.]

[Wollheim, Richard (2015). *Art and its Objects*. Cambridge University Press. §§. 1-8; 35-37.]

[Levinson, Jerrold (1980). 'What a Musical Work is'. *Journal of Philosophy* 77 (1):5-28.]

Essay Question: Does an appropriate ontology of art require some form of Platonism?

Reading Week.

This week should be used as an opportunity to get ahead on the reading for future meetings, and to start planning the summative essay.

Week 6: Cartesian Dualism.

*Descartes, René (1971). 'Sixth Meditation' in Elizabeth Anscombe & Peter Geach (eds.) *Philosophical Writings: Descartes*. Pearson.

*Foster, John (2001). 'A Brief Defense of the Cartesian View' in Kevin Corcoran (ed.) *Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons*. Cornell University Press.

Williams, Bernard (2005). 'Mind and its Place in Nature' in *Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry*. Routledge.

Broadie, Sarah (2001). 'Soul and Body in Plato and Descartes.' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 101 (3):295–308.

[Parfit, D. (1984). *Reasons and Persons*. Oxford University Press. §§81-82]

[Lowe, E. J. (2009). 'Substance Dualism : A Non-Cartesian Approach.' In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), *The Waning of Materialism: New Essays*. Oxford University Press]

[Shoemaker, Sydney (1984). 'Immortality and Dualism', in *Identity, Cause and Mind*. Cambridge University Press.]

Optional listening: 'Cartesian Dualism', *University of Oxford: General Philosophy Podcast*: <https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/43-cartesian-dualism>.

Optional listening: 'Peter Adamson on Avicenna's Flying Man', *Philosophy Bites*: <http://philosophybites.com/2012/11/peter-adamson-on-avicennas-flying-man-thought-experiment.html>.

Essay Question: "Descartes provides insufficient motivation for Cartesian dualism." Discuss.

Week 7: The Interaction Problem for Cartesian Dualism

*Lisa Shapiro (ed.) (2007). *The Correspondence Between Princess Elisabeth and Descartes*. University of Chicago Press. pp. 61-73.

*Kim, Jaegwon (2001). 'Lonely Souls: Causation and Substance Dualism', in Kevin Corcoran (ed.) *Soul, Body, and Survival: Essay on the Metaphysics of Human Persons*. Cornell University Press.

Foster, John (1991). 'Token-Identity and Psychophysical Causation.' in *The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind*. Routledge.

Schmaltz Tad M., (2008). 'Causation in Psychology.' in *Descartes on Causation*. Oxford University Press.

[Wong, Hong Yu (2007). 'Cartesian Psychophysics'. in Peter van Inwagen & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), *Persons: Human and Divine*. Clarendon Press.]

Essay Question: Is there a causal interaction problem for Cartesian Dualism? If so, what is it?

Week 8: The Ghost in the Machine

*Ryle, Gilbert (1949). *The Concept of Mind*. Hutchinson. Ch.1-2.

Anscombe, G.E.M. (1981). 'The First Person.' in *The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, Vol 2: Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind*. Blackwell.

Strawson, P. F. (1959). 'Persons' in *Individuals*. Routledge.

[Smart, J.J.C. (1959) 'Sensations and Brain Processes.' *The Philosophical Review* 68 (2): 141-156.]

[O'Brien, Lucy F. (1994). 'Anscombe and the Self-Reference Rule.' *Analysis* 54 (4):277 - 281.]

[Snowdon, Paul F. (2009). 'Persons' and Persons.' *Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu* 16 (4):449-476.]

[Kripke, Saul A. (2011). 'The First Person.' in *Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers Vol I*. Oxford University Press.]

Essay Question: Does Cartesian dualism rest on a conceptual mistake?

Week 9: Property Dualism

*Chalmers, D. J. (1997). 'Naturalistic Dualism.' in *The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory*. Oxford University Press. Ch. 4: 'Naturalistic Dualism'.

*Schneider, Susan (2012). 'Why Property Dualists Must Reject Substance Physicalism.' *Philosophical Studies* 157 (1):61-76.]

Zimmerman, Dean (2010). 'From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism.' *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 84 (1):119 - 150.

Mackie, Penelope (2011). 'Property Dualism and Substance Dualism.' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 111 (1pt1):181-199.

[Yang, Eric (2015). 'The Compatibility of Property Dualism and Substance Materialism.' *Philosophical Studies* 172 (12):3211-3219.]

[Kim, Jaegwon (2002). 'The Many Problems of Mental Causation' (extract from *Mind in a Physical World*) in Chalmers, D. J. (ed.) *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings*. Oxford University Press.]

[Snowdon, Paul (1989). 'On Formulating Materialism and Dualism.' in Heil J. (eds) *Cause, Mind, and Reality*. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 47. Springer.]

Essay Question: Is property dualism compatible with substance monism?

Week 10: Feminism and Dualism

*Spelman, Elizabeth V. (1982). 'Woman as Body: Ancient and Contemporary Views.' *Feminist Studies* 8 (1):109.

James, Susan (2000). 'Feminism in Philosophy of Mind: The Question of Personal Identity'. in Miranda Fricker & Jennifer Hornsby (eds.) *The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press.

Lloyd, Genevieve (1984). *The Man of Reason: 'Male' & 'Female' in Western Philosophy*. Routledge. pp. 2-10; 18-22; 39-51.

[Shapiro, Lisa (1999). 'Princess Elizabeth and Descartes: The Union of Soul and Body and the Practice of Philosophy.' *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 7 (3):503 – 520.]

[Grosz, Elizabeth (1994). 'Refiguring Bodies' in *Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism*. Indiana University Press.]

[Young, Iris Marion (1980). 'Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and Spatiality.' *Human Studies* 3 (1):137 - 156.]

Essay Question: Are there legitimate feminist complaints against substance dualism? If so, do those complaints also apply to property dualism?

Summative Essay Questions:

- (1) What motivates the theory of forms that is presented in the Phaedo? Is this theory well-motivated?
- (2) Do abstracta have a distinctive explanatory role?
- (3) Is there an epistemological problem for Platonism? If so, what is it?
- (4) Does an appropriate ontology of art require some form of Platonism?
- (5) Are all abstracta eternal and unchanging?
- (6) "Descartes provides insufficient motivation for Cartesian dualism." Discuss.
- (7) Is there a problem of causal interaction for Cartesian dualism? If so, what is it?
- (8) "There are acausal abstracta, but not acausal concreta." Discuss.
- (9) Does Cartesian dualism rest on a conceptual mistake?
- (10) Is property dualism compatible with substance monism?
- (11) Are there reasons to favour property dualism over substance dualism?
- (12) Is immortality only plausible for a substance dualist?
- (13) Are there legitimate feminist complaints against substance dualism? If so, do those complaints also apply to property dualism?